One must have some way of selecting which facts are ‘relevant’ and which are not, an activity which naturally requires the use of some theory, a theory which in turn may be widely disputed. While in this particular case both interpretations are equally ‘correct’, in many cases scientific and philosophical disputes, however, it is often unclear whether one, both, or none of the differing interpretations of the relevant facts are correct.Īnother problem with observation is that there are always far too many empirical facts for us to consider all of them. An interesting illustrative case can be found in a popular drawing called the ‘duck-rabbit’, a sketch which can be interpreted as either a drawing of a duck or of a rabbit, depending on the ‘theory’ one applies in interpreting the pattern of lines. Historians of science have given many examples of instances where proponents of rival theories have interpreted the same empirical evidence in very different ways, in accordance with their theoretical commitments. Rather, empirical evidence is always interpreted within the context of one’s preexisting ideas, conceptions, and expectations, which can often have a dramatic effect on how observations are understood or what they are taken to mean. The problem with this answer is that there is no ‘neutral’ vantage point from which such facts can be gathered or interpreted. This concept is a reaction to the idea that disputes about the way the world is can be easily and simply resolved by simply ‘looking at the facts’, or performing some sort of experiment or observation. The idea that observation is theory dependent is central to many debates in the philosophy of science.

Observation theory